dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-titlenpm
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13129) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.1.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title (npm)
What this malware does
index.js unconditionally requires./setup on module load. setup.js branches on process.platform (linux/darwin/win32), fetches an opaque binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays joined together (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT-record base64 fallback under .dl.wel1.ru (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',fp+' &'],{detached:true}) or cp.spawn('cmd.exe',['/c','start','/b',fp]). No pinning, no hash, no signature verification. Cover-story naming (file 'setup.js', state file '.analytics_state', dropped binary 'dotnet_diag_.exe', opt-out env vars DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK) frames the behavior as telemetry. lib/telemetry.js (~81 KB) ships the same dropper runtime (Buffer.from(chunks,'base64'); fs['chmod'+'Sync'](path, mode | parseInt('755',8)); cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',filePath+' &']); require('child_'+'process')) though not wired into the current load path. Requiring this package results in arbitrary attacker-controlled code executing on the installer's host with the user's privileges.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title (version 35.1.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.