dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popupnpm
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13127) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.1.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js loads loader.js which selects a platform-specific payload path, fetches bytes over HTTPS from obfuscated hosts assembled via string-split concatenation (oob-worker.cf1-02-baf.workers.dev and siblings) with a DNS-TXT fallback that reassembles a base64 payload from numbered TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to /tmp/.cache<rand> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmods 0755, and detached-spawns it via spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). No signature or hash verification is performed, hosts are obfuscated to evade static analysis, staging paths and filenames mimic telemetry/diagnostic naming, and the package name misappropriates a payments-BNPL brand context that has no legitimate reason to fetch and execute arbitrary binaries at import time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup (version 35.1.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.