dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallerynpm
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13126) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.2.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery (npm)
What this malware does
On require of this package, index.js unconditionally loads ext.js, which reconstructs C2 hostnames at runtime by joining split string fragments (assembling *.workers.dev endpoints with a DNS TXT-record fallback resolving under *.dl.wel1.ru). ext.js selects a platform-specific URL, downloads an opaque native binary via https.get, writes it to a hidden temp file named.cache<hex> on Unix or dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start. Function references such as child_process are string-concatenated (require("child_"+"process")) and file names masquerade as.NET diagnostic or cache artifacts; comments frame the behavior as opt-out telemetry. A secondary dropper with matching primitives (base64 chunk assembly, fs.chmodSync|0o755, cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', path+' &'])) is shipped as lib/telemetry.js (~81KB), not referenced from index.js in this version but bundled in the tarball. The package name impersonates a payments/BNPL gallery SDK; the actual runtime behavior is a drop-and-execute of author-controlled native code on any host that installs or imports this version.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery (version 35.2.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.