dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-headernpm
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13341) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.3.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, shim.js assembles remote hostnames at runtime by joining split string fragments (four Cloudflare Workers subdomains such as oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev / cf103-070 / cf102-baf / cf99-9b3, with a DNS-TXT fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru), downloads an opaque binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with unref(). Execution is gated behind a lock file and DO_NOT_TRACK/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT environment variables framed as telemetry opt-outs. The runtime-reconstructed destinations, disguised filenames, and detached background execution demonstrate deliberate concealment. Nothing in the package's stated 'device integration / BNPL header' purpose justifies fetching and executing an opaque binary from anonymous Cloudflare Workers hosts on module load.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header (version 35.3.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.