dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallerynpm
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13338) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.9.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, bootstrap.js fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers subdomains (with a DNS-TXT chunked-retrieval fallback to *.wel1.ru), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache<rand> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Destination hostnames and API names are string-concatenation-obfuscated (host fragments joined via.join(""), require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade static inspection. The destinations are anonymous workers.dev endpoints unrelated to the package's stated purpose ("mobile SDK"); no hash or signature verification is performed and the payload path uses hidden dot-cache or.NET-diagnostic-lookalike names. lib/telemetry.js ships a duplicate copy of the drop-and-exec routine wrapped in an "Analytics SDK" comment block as an alternate payload carrier.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery (version 35.9.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.