dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-setnpm
dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13337) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.8.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set (npm)
What this malware does
On require, index.js loads shim.js which selects a platform-specific endpoint from a set of runtime-assembled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT base64 fallback under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru. Hostnames are hidden by splitting across array fragments joined at runtime. shim.js downloads an opaque binary payload with no hash or signature verification, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under decoy filenames (dotnet_diag<rand>.exe on Windows,.cache<rand> on Unix), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via cmd.exe /c start or /bin/sh -c '<file> &'. A marker file analytics_state/.analytics_state is written, stderr logging is suppressed, and environment opt-outs (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) frame the dropper as telemetry. A dormant 81 KB lib/telemetry.js contains a parallel download-write-chmod-spawn code path with base64 payload reassembly, not currently referenced. The declared purpose of the package (a BNPL button UI component) does not require fetching or executing native binaries.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set (version 35.8.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.