dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-videonpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13335) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.4.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package's main entry, index.js loads adapter.js which performs OS/arch detection and fetches an opaque binary from string-split-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk.dl.wel1.ru). The retrieved bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under decoy names (.cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod 0755, and spawned detached through /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with stdio ignored (adapter.js:118-124). Destination hostnames and the child_process module name are reassembled from split string literals at runtime (['sdk.dl','.wel1.','ru'].join(''); require('child' + 'process')) with cover comments framing the code as 'telemetry/analytics'. A sibling module lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) mirrors the same fetch -> base64-decode -> chmod 0755 -> /bin/sh spawn primitives as a companion payload. The delivery infrastructure, destination obfuscation, decoy filenames, and lack of any integrity check or publisher-matching source identify this as a supply-chain dropper rather than a legitimate runtime download.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video (version 35.4.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.