dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-titlenpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13334) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.7.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, index.js loads setup.js, which selects a platform-specific path, fetches an opaque binary from a rotating pool of Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<rnd> or TEMP\dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Destination hostnames and the child_process require are constructed by joining split string fragments to evade static analysis. If the HTTPS fetch fails, the fallback path reassembles a base64 payload from numbered DNS TXT records under .dl.wel1.ru (c.<domain> returns a chunk count, then 0.<domain>..N.<domain> are concatenated and base64-decoded) and executes the result the same way. The disguised filenames (dotnet_diag_.exe,.cache_*,.analytics_state), anonymous Cloudflare Workers infrastructure, DNS covert channel, and opt-out gated only by DISABLE_TELEMETRY are all consistent with a hostile dropper delivering attacker-controlled code to the installer's machine at package load time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title (version 35.7.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.