dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swaggernpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13330) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.6.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger (npm)
What this malware does
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger ships an index.js that unconditionally requires setup.js on load. setup.js reconstructs remote hostnames from array-fragment string joins (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) to defeat literal-string scanning, downloads a per-platform binary payload, writes it to /tmp as a hidden dotfile on Unix or to the Windows temp directory as dotnet_diag_*.exe, sets mode 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. When HTTPS delivery fails, it falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru: it reads a record count from c.<domain> and reassembles base64-encoded binary bytes from numbered TXT records. The fetched code is unpinned, unsigned, and unrelated to the package's declared BNPL swagger purpose. A separate lib/telemetry.js bundles the same drop-and-exec primitives (fs["chmod"+"Sync"], cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", filePath+" &"])) using bracket-string reconstruction; it is not reachable from the current main entrypoint but is staged in the tarball.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger (version 35.6.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.