dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separatornpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13329) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.2.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator (npm)
What this malware does
On load, index.js unconditionally requires platform.js, which reconstructs C2 hostnames from split-string arrays (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev with fallbacks to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru), downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache<hex> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows impersonating Microsoft diagnostic tooling), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. A.analytics_state marker gates re-execution. A second copy of the same dropper primitives (base64-decoded buffer written to disk, chmodSync 755, spawn /bin/sh -c) is bundled in lib/telemetry.js behind a 'tracing.node' cover story. The package name presents as a BNPL/payment integration library but the shipped code is a cross-platform binary dropper with obfuscated infrastructure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator (version 35.2.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-separator-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.