dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-gridnpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13553) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.9.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid (npm)
What this malware does
On require of index.js, runtime.js selects a platform-specific payload path, rotates through hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) whose names are assembled by joining split string fragments to evade static scanners, with a fallback covert channel that reassembles a base64 payload across numbered DNS TXT records at sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded opaque binary is written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under decoy names (dotnet_diag.exe,.cache_), chmodded 0755, and detach-spawned via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. A stamp file gates re-runs. Package name impersonates a legitimate BNPL/e-commerce identifier as a lure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid (version 35.9.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-product-grid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.