dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-originationnpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13323) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.6.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination (npm)
What this malware does
On require, index.js loads ext.js which detects platform, constructs C2 hostnames by joining split string fragments (e.g. "oob-worker.cf99-9b3.worker" + "s.dev"), downloads an opaque binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf101-adf, cf102-baf, cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback (base64 chunks reassembled from resolveTxt of numeric subdomains under dl.wel1.ru), writes the payload to a disguised path under /tmp or %TEMP% (.cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods 0755 on Unix, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe. A state file throttles re-runs. Package name resembles a legitimate BNPL/payment integration but the shipped code implements a remote-payload dropper with no relation to that stated purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination (version 35.6.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-origination-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.