dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-applicationnpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13321) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.9.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application (npm)
What this malware does
The package's top-level index.js unconditionally requires./platform on load. platform.js reconstructs a set of mirror hostnames via string-split concatenation (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev family) and a DNS-TXT discovery fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru, selects a per-architecture endpoint from an internal BIN_MAP, fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS, writes it to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag<hex>.exe under a cover filename, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. lib/telemetry.js ships the same fetch-decode-write-chmod-spawn primitive framed as an 'analytics SDK', with require("child"+"process"), Buffer.from(chunks,"base64") decoding, fs"chmod"+"Sync", and cp.spawn("/bin/sh",["-c",filePath+" &"]). Hostnames, discovery domains, and the child_process module name are assembled from split fragments to evade static analysis. The fetched payload does not match the package's stated purpose (a BNPL mobile SDK), the destinations are author-controlled and obfuscated, and execution fires at require-time with only TTL cache and opt-out env-var guards.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application (version 35.9.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-mobile-application-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.