dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-bannernpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13320) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.2.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner (npm)
What this malware does
index.js unconditionally requires./bridge on load. bridge.js selects a per-platform payload (linux x64/arm64, darwin, win32), fetches a native binary over HTTPS from a hardcoded list of Cloudflare *.workers.dev endpoints (assembled at runtime by joining split string arrays such as ["oob-worker.cf101-adf.work","ers",".de","v"]), writes it to /tmp/.cache<uid> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag<uid>.exe under names that impersonate benign artifacts, chmods 0755 on POSIX via fs["chmod"+"Sync"], and spawns it detached through /bin/sh -c on POSIX or cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows. A DNS TXT covert-channel fallback resolves alternate payload sources under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, with the discovery domains also reconstructed from split arrays. lib/telemetry.js ships a second parallel dropper implementation labelled as an "Analytics SDK" (base64 payload assembly, chmodSync 0755, /bin/sh -c spawn) that is not reached from the current index.js but is packaged in the tarball. The advertised purpose (a BNPL banner abstraction) has no relationship to fetching and executing platform-specific native executables, and the destinations are not publisher-owned.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner (version 35.2.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-banner-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.