dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faqnpm
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13551) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.8.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, index.js loads runtime.js which selects a platform-specific binary path, downloads an opaque payload from string-array-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback that reconstructs a base64 payload from numbered subdomains of *.dl.wel1.ru (e.g. sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache<uid> on *nix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<uid>.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Destination hostnames are assembled at runtime via array-join to defeat static string search; execution is gated by a TTL cache and opt-out env vars. The purported BNPL-FAQ purpose has no relationship to fetching and executing native binaries from anonymous worker hosts.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq (version 35.8.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.