dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallerynpm
dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13301) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.5.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of this package, index.js loads _bridge.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback channel over sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru that reassembles a base64-encoded payload from TXT records. The fetched bytes are written under /tmp or %TEMP% with a disguised filename (.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. The C2 host strings and the child_process module name are split across array joins (["oob-worker.cf103-070.wo","rk","ers",".de","v"].join(""), require("child_"+"process")) to evade static matching. Cover-story identifiers (analytics_state, DISABLE_TELEMETRY) frame the drop as telemetry. A second, structurally identical dropper ships in lib/telemetry.js (~81 KB) dressed as an analytics SDK: dynamic require("child_"+"process"), base64 buffer reassembly, chmodSync(..., 0o755), and cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", filePath+" &"],...).
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery (version 35.5.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.