dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallerynpm
dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13301) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.5.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of this package, index.js loads _bridge.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback channel over sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru that reassembles a base64-encoded payload from TXT records. The fetched bytes are written under /tmp or %TEMP% with a disguised filename (.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. The C2 host strings and the child_process module name are split across array joins (["oob-worker.cf103-070.wo","rk","ers",".de","v"].join(""), require("child_"+"process")) to evade static matching. Cover-story identifiers (analytics_state, DISABLE_TELEMETRY) frame the drop as telemetry. A second, structurally identical dropper ships in lib/telemetry.js (~81 KB) dressed as an analytics SDK: dynamic require("child_"+"process"), base64 buffer reassembly, chmodSync(..., 0o755), and cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", filePath+" &"],...).
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery (version 35.5.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-card-gallery-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.