dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-setnpm
dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13300) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set (npm)
What this malware does
Requiring the package loads vendor.js, which reconstructs remote hosts from array-join fragments (resolving to Cloudflare Workers hosts such as oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev and a *.dl.wel1.ru fallback discovered via DNS-TXT), downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS with no hash or signature verification, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start. A TTL stamp is used to avoid re-fetching on subsequent loads. The advertised purpose (a BNPL button UI set) has no legitimate need for downloading and executing an external binary, and the destination hosts are obfuscated to defeat static string scanning.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set (version 35.2.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-button-set-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.