dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-containernpm
dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13293) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.3.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js loads bootstrap.js, which reconstructs remote hosts by array.join string concatenation (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev, with a *.dl.wel1.ru DNS-TXT fallback), downloads an opaque platform-specific binary over HTTPS (or via chunked base64 in DNS TXT records against c.<domain>/i.<domain> when HTTPS is unavailable), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached and unref'd with stdio ignored via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start. The package presents itself as a trivial BNPL container wrapper and ships no code related to that stated purpose; the fetched bytes are neither pinned nor hash-verified, the destinations are obfuscated to defeat static inspection, the DNS-TXT channel is designed to bypass HTTPS egress filtering, and the on-disk filenames impersonate legitimate diagnostic/cache artifacts.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container (version 35.3.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.