dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-setnpm
dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13290) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.9.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set (npm)
What this malware does
On require, index.js loads platform.js which reconstructs download hostnames from split-and-joined array literals (e.g. oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) and fetches a platform-specific native binary via https.get. The payload is written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a masqueraded name (.cache, dotnet_diag_.exe), chmod'd 0o755, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp+' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). A secondary DNS-TXT covert channel over sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru serves base64-chunked payload as fallback (c.<domain> yields chunk count, i.<domain> returns base64 chunks decoded with Buffer.from(...,'base64')). Execution is gated by a filesystem stamp and env vars framed as telemetry opt-outs. The package is advertised as data-store bindings and has no legitimate need to fetch and execute a native binary from anonymous workers.dev hosts at require time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set (version 35.9.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-set-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.