dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-buttonnpm
dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12364) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 20.5.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button (npm)
What this malware does
On require, index.js loads loader.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are reassembled at runtime from split-string arrays (e.g. oob-worker.cf1XX-*.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback resolving under *.dl.well1.site. The binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmodded 0755, and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start /b (_loader.js line 121-127). Hostname strings are split across array literals joined at runtime, and comments frame the behavior as 'telemetry' with DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK opt-outs as cover. A separate lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) is not referenced from the entry points but ships the same drop-and-execute primitives (HttpTransport, ServiceDiscovery, cp.spawn('/bin/sh',[ '-c', filePath+' &']), chmodSync 0755, base64 chunk buffering) as a redundant loader. The package name mimics a Russian BNPL merchant integration but its only observable effect on require is fetching and executing an unverified remote binary.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button (version 20.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-store-button-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.