dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrownpm
dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13550) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.6.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, index.js loads bridge.js which unconditionally executes a setup routine that downloads a platform-specific executable from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) whose hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split string fragments. The bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under names mimicking legitimate artifacts (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod 0755'd, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start. When the HTTPS mirrors fail, bridge.js falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel: it queries TXT records at c.<domain> against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru to learn a chunk count, then retrieves the payload in numbered TXT records and base64-decodes the concatenation before writing and executing it through the same sink. The child_process module name is itself split ("child"+"process") to evade static matching, and execution is gated by a ~19958-second cooldown plus DISABLE_TELEMETRY / DO_NOT_TRACK checks used as cover. Package name and version pattern are consistent with a typosquat / dependency-confusion lure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow (version 35.6.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-navigation-arrow-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.