distributorblocknpm
distributorblock is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13503) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.8.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in distributorblock (npm)
What this malware does
The package's main entry (index.js) re-exports a decoy telemetry module and unconditionally require()s setup.js. On require, setup.js selects a platform-specific path, downloads an opaque binary from one of four hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts under oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev (assembled via string concatenation to obscure the literal), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on POSIX or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, sets mode 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with stdio ignored and unref(). A /tmp flag file rate-limits repeated runs and a DO_NOT_TRACK check gates execution. When HTTP retrieval fails, setup.js reassembles the payload from base64-encoded chunks served over DNS TXT records at c.<domain> and 0..N.<domain> under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru — a covert channel that bypasses HTTP egress controls. The package's declared purpose ("API client wrappers") is inconsistent with fetching and executing a native binary at import time, and author metadata is empty. The naming (.cache_, dotnet_diag_), detached spawn, and DNS-TXT fallback are consistent with a trojan dropper designed to evade both sandboxing and network defenses.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for distributorblock (version 35.8.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging distributorblock across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove distributorblock from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If distributorblock was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks distributorblock before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks distributorblock-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.