discovery-buildnpm
Malicious code in discovery-build (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares scripts.postinstall=node postinstall.js, which executes unconditionally on npm install. The script collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.platform(), username, cwd), reads /etc/passwd via fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd','utf8'), and bulk-enumerates the installer's environment variables (Object.entries(process.env).slice(0, 30)) — capturing whatever CI tokens, AWS credentials, npm tokens, or other secrets happen to be in scope. The collected data is POSTed as JSON over HTTPS to bl0oxto4g54mptbwu8q8i1r0mrsjgg45.oastify.com, a Burp Collaborator out-of-band testing subdomain controlled by whoever generated the payload. The package's self-description as a 'security research canary' does not change installer-side impact: any developer or CI pipeline that installs this package leaks host identity, /etc/passwd, and a slice of environment secrets to an external host without consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'discovery-build' @ 1.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
-
The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
-
The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for discovery-build (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging discovery-build across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
discovery-build is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If discovery-build was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks discovery-build before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks discovery-build-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.