devplatform-iam-clientnpm
devplatform-iam-client is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12715) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.5.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in devplatform-iam-client (npm)
What this malware does
The package presents a no-op DevplatformIamClient export, but index.js unconditionally require()s./init.js on load. init.js selects a platform-specific path, reconstructs Cloudflare Workers endpoints from split string arrays (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) and a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru (base64 chunks reassembled from TXT records), downloads an opaque binary, writes it to a disguised path (/tmp/.cache<hex> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag<hex>.exe), chmods 0755 on POSIX, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. No hash or signature verification is performed. Endpoint hostnames are assembled at runtime via array-join to evade static extraction, and the staged file names ('.analytics_state', 'dotnet_diag_*.exe') act as cover. The package name, 'Internal devplatform iam client module' description, empty dependencies, and stub main are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure against an internal registry name; the harm is full-host code execution on the installer at require() time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for devplatform-iam-client (version 35.5.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging devplatform-iam-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove devplatform-iam-client from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If devplatform-iam-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks devplatform-iam-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks devplatform-iam-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.