Which versions of deployowl are malicious?

The following npm versions of deployowl are flagged malicious: 2.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate deployowl if I installed it?

deployowl is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed deployowl — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If deployowl was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is deployowl part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — deployowl is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010676 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find deployowl across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for deployowl (version 2.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging deployowl across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

deployowlnpm

Malicious code in deployowl (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10677

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall deployowl

What this malware does

The SDK's captureSnapshot() iterates Object.entries(process.env) and attaches every environment variable to every captured error, then POSTs the payload to https://api.deployowl.com/api/v1/errors. Variables whose names contain SECRET/KEY/TOKEN/PASSWORD/AUTH/CREDENTIAL/PRIVATE/URI/PASS/STRIPE/AWS/DATABASE are truncated to a 3-character prefix plus '***' (still leaking a usable prefix of each secret); variables not matching that keyword list (HOME, USER, application config, custom-named secrets) are sent in full. Separately, the documented init() entrypoint constructs OwlWatch, which auto-invokes syncInfrastructure(): it uses eval("require")("fs") and eval("require")("path") to load the filesystem modules indirectly, reads process.cwd()/package.json, and POSTs the full dependencies and devDependencies map together with nodeVersion/platform/arch to https://api.deployowl.com/api/v1/infrastructure. Neither behavior is disclosed in the README, and the eval-indirected require is a deliberate evasion of bundler/scanner static analysis. Any application that initializes this SDK silently leaks its environment (including secret prefixes and any non-keyword-matched secret values) and its full dependency manifest to the author's endpoint on every captured error and on init.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

b875dd11198fbfc694fe8b3227090e95f13734b5cf64556c6c727b48d7471035

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for deployowl (version 2.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging deployowl across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
deployowl is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If deployowl was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks deployowl before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. deployowl on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010676

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks deployowl-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring