delivery-ci-tech-holdernpm
delivery-ci-tech-holder is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12683) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.3.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in delivery-ci-tech-holder (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, index.js loads support.js, which reconstructs hardcoded destinations from split string arrays (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, with a DNS-TXT fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru), downloads a platform-specific binary, writes it to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd with stdio ignored and unref(). No hash or signature verification is performed, the destination hosts are unrelated to the package publisher, filenames impersonate legitimate system components (dotnet_diag,.cache_), and the string-split reassembly and DNS-TXT fallback channel are designed to evade static inspection. The fetched bytes are executed with the installer's privileges.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for delivery-ci-tech-holder (version 35.3.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging delivery-ci-tech-holder across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
delivery-ci-tech-holder is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove delivery-ci-tech-holder, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If delivery-ci-tech-holder was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks delivery-ci-tech-holder before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks delivery-ci-tech-holder-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.