delivery-ci-sagenpm

On require() of the package, index.js loads _loader.js which selects a platform-specific asset path and fetches a binary from one of four string-split-obfuscated oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev hostnames (with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (POSIX) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe (Windows), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh',...) or spawn('cmd',...). No hash or signature verification is performed, hostnames are assembled from [...].join('') fragments to evade static inspection, and the code is gated by DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK env vars while dropping a .analytics_state flag file as a telemetry cover story. Filenames impersonate legitimate.NET/system artifacts (dotnet_diag_, dot-prefixed cache). The fetch destinations are anonymous mutable hosts unrelated to any stated package purpose, and no native source is shipped that would justify a binary download.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.