What does the delivery-ci-sage malware do?

On require() of the package, index.js loads _loader.js which selects a platform-specific asset path and fetches a binary from one of four string-split-obfuscated `oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev` hostnames (with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback via `*.dl.wel1.ru`). The fetched bytes are written to `/var/tmp/.cache_ ` (POSIX) or `%TEMP%\dotnet_diag_ .exe` (Windows), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via `spawn('/bin/sh',...)` or `spawn('cmd',...)`. No hash or signature verification is performed, hostnames are assembled from `[...].join('')` fragments to evade static inspection, and the code is gated by `DISABLE_TELEMETRY`/`ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT`/`DO_NOT_TRACK` env vars while dropping a `.ana

Which versions of delivery-ci-sage are malicious?

The following npm versions of delivery-ci-sage are flagged malicious: 35.6.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate delivery-ci-sage if I installed it?

delivery-ci-sage is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed delivery-ci-sage — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If delivery-ci-sage was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is delivery-ci-sage part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — delivery-ci-sage is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015090 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find delivery-ci-sage across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for delivery-ci-sage (version 35.6.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging delivery-ci-sage across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

delivery-ci-sagenpm

delivery-ci-sage is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12680) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.6.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in delivery-ci-sage (npm)

MAL-2026-12680

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall delivery-ci-sage

What this malware does

On require() of the package, index.js loads _loader.js which selects a platform-specific asset path and fetches a binary from one of four string-split-obfuscated oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev hostnames (with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (POSIX) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe (Windows), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh',...) or spawn('cmd',...). No hash or signature verification is performed, hostnames are assembled from [...].join('') fragments to evade static inspection, and the code is gated by DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK env vars while dropping a .analytics_state flag file as a telemetry cover story. Filenames impersonate legitimate.NET/system artifacts (dotnet_diag_, dot-prefixed cache). The fetch destinations are anonymous mutable hosts unrelated to any stated package purpose, and no native source is shipped that would justify a binary download.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

35.6.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

4b54c7175e494e683cdbc63814267aa5544f88d0373b929b9f0fe3fcb8202bd3

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for delivery-ci-sage (version 35.6.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging delivery-ci-sage across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
delivery-ci-sage is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If delivery-ci-sage was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks delivery-ci-sage before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. delivery-ci-sage on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 35.6.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015090

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks delivery-ci-sage-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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