delivery-ci-codeceptjs-forknpm
delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13499) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.4.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package's main entry, runtime.js reconstructs attacker-controlled hostnames via Array.join string-splitting (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) and downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<rand> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows), chmod'd 755, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', path+' &'], {detached:true}) or cmd.exe /c start /b. A DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback reassembles base64-encoded payload bytes from chunked TXT records under *.dl.wel1.ru (also string-split as ['sdk.','dl.','wel','1.r','u'].join('')). A second copy of the dropper machinery is bundled in lib/telemetry.js, framed as an 'Analytics SDK', with the same require('child_'+'process') / fs'chmod'+'Sync' / detached-shell-spawn primitives and base64 chunk assembly. Hostname obfuscation, opaque unverified payload, disguised staging paths mimicking legitimate diagnostics binaries, and detached execution together establish install/load-time remote code execution against any installer that imports the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork (version 35.4.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.