debugclinpm
Advisory published Updated
debugcli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6790) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 4.3.5, 4.3.6, 4.3.7…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in debugcli (npm)
What this malware does
The package name debugcli shadows the popular debug package, and index.js is a thin re-export (module.exports = require('debug')) so callers observe legitimate behavior. The real payload runs via "postinstall": "node install.js" in package.json. On install, install.js performs: (1) bulk credential-file harvest — reads ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.npmrc, ~/.ssh/config, ~/.pypirc, ~/.netrc, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.kube/config, gcloud application_default_credentials, .git-credentials, Azure tokens, composer auth, and walks the current working directory upward collecting .env, .env.local, .env.production, .env.development; (2) process.env scraping — iterates process.env and filters keys matching TOKEN/SECRET/PASSWORD/API_KEY/AUTH/PRIVATE/AWS_/GITHUB_/NPM_*/OPENAI/ANTHROPIC/DATABASE_URL/STRIPE/TWILIO patterns; (3) browser wallet theft — locates Chrome extension Local Extension Settings for MetaMask (extension id nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbecgpgknn) and TrustWallet (egjidjbpglichdcondbcbdnbeeppgdph) and archives the vault directories via powershell Compress-Archive on Windows or tar czf... --exclude=LOCK on Unix; (4) exfiltration — POSTs collected env vars, credential files,.env contents, and wallet archives to api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage and /sendDocument, with the bot token and chat_id stored as XOR-encoded byte arrays (ENC_TOKEN, ENC_CHAT) decoded at runtime using the current lodash package version fetched from registry.npmjs.org/lodash dist-tags.latest as the XOR key; (5) evasion — isSandbox() checks CPU/RAM, hostname regex (sandbox|malware|virus|sample|cuckoo|any.run|hybrid), analysis env vars, and HOME directory age, and skips execution on analysis machines; a per-machine hashed lockfile prevents re-execution within 24h; and finally fs.unlinkSync(__filename) removes install.js after exfil.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'debugcli' @ 4.3.9 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for debugcli (6 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
debugcli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If debugcli was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks debugcli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.