ddok-modalnpm
ddok-modal is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10497) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in ddok-modal (npm)
What this malware does
ddok-modal presents itself as a reusable React wallet-connection modal supporting MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby, TronLink, Bitget, Coinbase, and Solflare, but the modal UIs are credential-harvesting impersonations of those wallets. Each wallet 'unlock' modal binds an onChange handler that calls sendKeyToBackend(userId, 'cha', newKeyword, <wallet_type>) on every keystroke and a submit handler that calls sendKeyToBackend(..., 'enter', keyword,...) on form submission, POSTing the captured password / recovery phrase to https://api.wagmiwallet.org/api/keys (with a websocket fallback at wss://api.wagmiwallet.org) and a secondary endpoint at https://wagmirequest.la. The payload includes user_id, key_type, the captured keys, wallet_type, and the visitor's IP address and geolocation (collected via api.ipify.org and ipapi.co at modal open). The modals reproduce real wallet copy ('Enter your password', 'Secret Recovery Phrase', 'MetaMask can't recover your password') and reference legitimate browser-extension IDs (e.g. nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn for MetaMask) to look authentic. Any web application that embeds this component relays its end users' wallet passwords and seed phrases to the package author's hardcoded infrastructure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ddok-modal (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ddok-modal across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ddok-modal is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ddok-modal was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ddok-modal before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ddok-modal-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.