date-uuidnpm
Malicious code in date-uuid (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package advertised as a UUIDv7 helper, but on require()/import it auto-invokes extractDateISO() in bootstrap.js, which reads README.md from process.cwd(), extracts two specific lines (120 and 123), and base64-decodes them after prepending 'aH' and inserting 'Rz' to reconstruct an 'http...' URL (the prefix 'aHR0c' decodes to 'http'). The reconstructed URL is fetched, written to os.tmpdir() as temp_<timestamp>.vbs (the '.vbs' extension is split as 'v'+'b'+'s' to evade grep), and executed via child_process.exec. The behavior is unrelated to the advertised UUID functionality. Sourcing the payload URL from the caller's README rather than the package source decouples the attacker-controlled destination from the published artifact and enables staged/deniable deployment: a chained attack or a future README edit can change what gets executed without republishing the package. Obfuscation devices (string-splitting the script extension, base64 framing of the URL prefix) co-located with the fetch-and-exec path indicate deliberate evasion intent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for date-uuid (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging date-uuid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove date-uuid from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If date-uuid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks date-uuid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks date-uuid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.