cxpher-linux-arm32npm
Malicious code in cxpher-linux-arm32 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's main is an ARM ELF binary that, when loaded, mkdtemp's a working directory under /dev/shm/.cxpher.XXXXXX or /tmp/.cxpher.XXXXXX, writes an unpacked JavaScript file (a.js and /tmp/.cxpher-wrap.%d.js), locates node at /usr/local/bin/node or /usr/bin/node, and execvp's node against the unpacked file. The bytes that ultimately run are decoded from an opaque high-entropy blob inside the ELF and are not human-auditable from the published tarball — equivalent to eval(decode(blob)) but in native form. The same binary reads /proc/self/status and parses the TracerPid: field, the canonical Linux anti-ptrace anti-debug check; legitimate native addons do not need this. Package metadata is placeholder (no author, homepage, repository, or README; description is the generic string "Native binary for cxpher on linux-arm32"), and the binary references an alternate environment-variable prefix (AGPK_AUDIO_FD alongside CXPHER_AUDIO_FD) suggesting it was renamed/repurposed from a different project. No documentation describes what code is unpacked and run on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cxpher-linux-arm32 (version 2.0.22). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cxpher-linux-arm32 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove cxpher-linux-arm32 from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If cxpher-linux-arm32 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cxpher-linux-arm32 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cxpher-linux-arm32-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.