cwao-unitsnpm
Malicious code in cwao-units (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./scripts/postbuild", where scripts/postbuild is a 976,568-byte Linux x86-64 ELF binary shipped in the tarball with no corresponding source, no native build configuration (no binding.gyp, no.c/.cc/.rs files, no node-gyp/cmake-js/prebuild-install tooling), and no mention in README. The package self-describes as a pure-JS Arweave/AO unit runner whose declared dependencies (arweave, express, cors, ramda, weavedb) are all pure JavaScript — there is no legitimate cover story for a platform-specific native binary. Strings inside the ELF include LIBBPF_0.0, PTRACE, NETLINK, HTTP/1.1, https://, Ed25519/RSA/MLKEM crypto primitives, and USERPROFILE, indicating network-capable, BPF/ptrace-capable native code. Every npm install cwao-units executes this opaque binary as the installer's user before the package is even loaded. The filename postbuild is suggestively chosen to mimic a benign build artifact, and the binary is invoked as a preinstall (not postinstall) hook so it fires before any inspection. This matches the canonical opaque-binary dropper pattern: doc-mismatch + thin lifecycle-script wrapper + undocumented native code with networking/tracing primitives.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cwao-units (version 0.8.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cwao-units across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cwao-units is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cwao-units was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cwao-units before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cwao-units-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.