Which versions of cryptostock are malicious?

The following npm versions of cryptostock are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate cryptostock if I installed it?

cryptostock is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed cryptostock — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If cryptostock was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is cryptostock part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — cryptostock is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-017234, IN-MAL-2026-017232 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find cryptostock across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cryptostock (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cryptostock across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

cryptostocknpm

cryptostock is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13693) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in cryptostock (npm)

MAL-2026-13693

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall cryptostock

What this malware does

index.js is an obfuscated payload that, on require(), starts a C2 client against https://badai.run.place: it registers a UID, long-polls /cekappapiapi.php for shell commands, executes them via child_process.exec, and POSTs stdout/stderr back to /fallback.php (AES-256-ECB encrypted). After a randomized 2-8 minute delay it enumerates installer-owned secret directories (/root/.ssh, /home//.ssh, /opt/wallet-keys, /etc/ssl/private, ~/.ethereum/keystore, /var/lib/ethereum/keystore, /mnt/crypto/wallets) via find for .pem/.key/UTC--/keystore files, filters those containing 'PRIVATE KEY', and reads process.env.ETH_PRIVATE_KEY; matches are exfiltrated to badai.run.place. For each harvested 64-hex private key the code instantiates web3 against Infura mainnet and broadcasts a signed ETH transfer of the account balance (minus gas) to a hardcoded drain address. Strings including module names, the C2 host, private-key markers, and keystore paths are base64-encoded in a string table and decoded at runtime; the file header self-identifies as an obfuscated build integrating StealthC2 from Badnew.py.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.0.01.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9ab293d041a75fa4fcfb65c996176a885720e7b60cf3dde4b19154c073c29454

b306961ecb92b341504593a0cb19a1128fe8cfb7e610a52615e0dbe146b73d66

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cryptostock (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cryptostock across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cryptostock is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cryptostock was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cryptostock before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. cryptostock on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-017234IN-MAL-2026-017232

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks cryptostock-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database