cryptodao-deploynpm
cryptodao-deploy is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5968) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 99.99.99). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in cryptodao-deploy (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares postinstall: node recon.js, which fires automatically on npm install. recon.js enumerates installer-side secrets — AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, NPM_TOKEN, GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN, SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, DB_PASSWORD, MNEMONIC and similar credential-shaped environment variables — reads .env files at multiple paths, and lists CI runner directories such as /builds/ and /home/gitlab-runner/. It also collects host/identity reconnaissance (hostname, platform, user, cwd, CI_PROJECT_PATH, CI_JOB_ID, CI_REGISTRY_USER/PASSWORD). The collected data is JSON-serialized and POSTed via https.request with rejectUnauthorized:false to webhook.site/d6d18927-e513-4df7-b019-58bfc64fe0dd and enqoojbegdvxj.x.pipedream.net. The package is named cryptodao-deploy and published at version 99.99.99 with an in-source comment 'CryptoDAO Dependency Confusion Reconnaissance Payload', indicating intent to override an internal private package via dependency-confusion resolution and run the exfil payload inside the victim's CI.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'cryptodao-deploy' @ 99.99.99 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cryptodao-deploy (version 99.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cryptodao-deploy across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cryptodao-deploy is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cryptodao-deploy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cryptodao-deploy before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cryptodao-deploy-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.