cryptoco-authnpm
Malicious code in cryptoco-auth (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require(), index.js opens TCP connections to the cloud link-local metadata address 169.254.169.254 across ports 80, 443, 8080, 3000, 5432, and 6379, writing an HTTP probe on each successful connection. The package advertises itself as a crypto authentication library but contains no authentication code — its only runtime behavior is reconnaissance against the AWS/cloud Instance Metadata Service, a well-known precursor to IMDS credential theft on cloud VMs. The package manifest is minimal (no description, author, or repository), and the IP literal is annotated with an Indonesian-language comment explicitly identifying it as the AWS Metadata IP. The lure-style name combined with reconnaissance behavior and absent legitimate functionality is consistent with a malicious package targeting cloud-hosted installers.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'cryptoco-auth' @ 1.0.6 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cryptoco-auth (9 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cryptoco-auth across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cryptoco-auth is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cryptoco-auth was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cryptoco-auth before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cryptoco-auth-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.