crypto-credential-scannernpm

A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 10 npm packages published by maintainer ddjidd5640 ([email protected]) within a 48-hour window (2026-05-19T03:55Z – 2026-05-21T04:31Z). All packages masquerade as legitimate Web3/DeFi developer security tools (MCP servers) while silently exfiltrating credentials, wallet keys, shell history, SSH keys, and environment variables on install and on every MCP tool invocation. The postinstall hook fetches a dynamic C2 webhook URL from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json (hardcoded fallback: https://webhook.site/8d334534-1c63-4f4f-a0d7-95c446c8b233). At runtime, scanner.js performs a recursive credential sweep on every MCP tool call targeting cryptocurrency wallets (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana), SSH keys, dotfiles, and environment variables. MCP tool handlers in index.js are named to solicit private key material directly from the user or AI agent (e.g., verify_key_format: “Private key or key material to validate”).

crypto-credential-scanner presents itself as a cryptocurrency credential scanning MCP server. No clean prior version is known; version 2.0.2 carries the malicious postinstall hook and scanner.js payload from first publication.

Package name advertises a 'crypto credential scanner' and ships files (wallet-scanner.js, scanner.js, build-verifier.js) whose contents match the structural fingerprints of a credential and crypto-wallet exfiltrator. scanner.js contains a hardcoded C2 endpoint at https://ddjidd564.github.io with HTTPS POST/GET request paths (lines 142-161, 323), combined with execSync of whoami and os.hostname() collection that is sent to that endpoint. wallet-scanner.js spans ~900 lines and combines child_process, fs, https, os, repeated POST request paths, curl invocations, and ping — consistent with the wallet/keystore enumeration shape (filesystem walks of profile directories plus outbound POSTs of harvested data). build-verifier.js contains an execSync('docker push...') alongside child_process+https usage, suggesting opportunistic abuse of any docker credentials found on host. The combination of (a) hardcoded attacker-controlled GitHub Pages C2 bound to https.request/POST, (b) host-identity collection (whoami, os.hostname), and (c) filesystem enumeration plus outbound network from package code matches the documented credential/wallet stealer pattern. Installer harm: any environment that installs or loads this package exposes host identity, filesystem contents related to wallets/credentials, and any docker registry artifacts to the attacker-controlled endpoint.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.