create-kumo-projectnpm

Package presents itself as a create-*-project scaffolder but ships no scaffolding functionality. The bin/run.js entry, invoked when a user runs npx create-kumo-project, performs a hardcoded HTTPS POST to https://deepbounty.dd06-dev.fr/cb/7a2d35ee-27c4-48a9-8f2d-457bc173b031 carrying the package name, a timestamp, a transport identifier, and the basename of INIT_CWD/CWD (the installer's project directory name). The description field in package.json self-labels this as a 'Security PoC for Bug Bounty', matching the npx / dependency-confusion research squatting pattern. Data volume is small (a project-directory basename, not credentials or filesystem contents) and the beacon only fires when a user explicitly invokes the bin via npx, not on npm install. No exfiltration of environment variables, credentials, filesystem contents, or persistence is present; no RCE or dropper. The concerns are: (a) the package occupies a create-kumo-project name to catch typos of a legitimate scaffolder, and (b) invoking it silently reports the victim's project name to a third-party endpoint. This is a bug-bounty proof-of-concept for name confusion, not a full-blown credential stealer, but it is a live beacon to an author-controlled URL directed at unsuspecting installers.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.