cosmosdb-servernpm
Malicious code in cosmosdb-server (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package squats the unscoped name cosmosdb-server, targeting users who mistype npx cosmosdb-server instead of the scoped @vercel/cosmosdb-server. The package.json declares bin: {"cosmosdb-server": "./index.js"} and self-describes as a 'bin-mismatch PoC' for the Vercel package. When invoked (via npx, bin execution, or require()), index.js collects os.hostname(), process.cwd(), process.platform, process.arch, and a timestamp and POSTs them to a hardcoded endpoint at https://callback-monitor.cyb3rsh4ykh.workers.dev/c, controlled by the package author. The 'security research / responsible disclosure' framing in the description does not constitute installer consent — the package is published live on the public registry under a name designed to capture mistyped invocations, and victims have no opportunity to opt out before their host identity and working-directory path are exfiltrated. Combination of (a) ≤2-edit name confusion against a scoped Vercel package, (b) hardcoded attacker-controlled exfil endpoint, and (c) immediate-on-execution data collection meets the typosquat-with-installer-harm threshold.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cosmosdb-server (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cosmosdb-server across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cosmosdb-server is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cosmosdb-server was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cosmosdb-server before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cosmosdb-server-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.