corporate-front-vuenpm
Malicious code in corporate-front-vue (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a near-empty shim (index.js exports an empty object) whose only meaningful content is a tarball-URL dependency declared in package.json: "ltidisafe": "https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.9.7.tgz". On npm install, npm fetches and installs that tarball directly from an arbitrary Google Cloud Storage bucket — bypassing npm registry review — and executes whatever lifecycle scripts and code it contains on the installer's machine. The package metadata reinforces the dependency-confusion shape: version 99.9.1 (a classic high-overshoot designed to outrank an internal-registry package of the same name), empty description, empty author, default ISC license. The path segment depenconf in the tarball URL further matches the dependency-confusion pattern. The registry-visible package exists solely as a loader for non-registry, attacker-controlled bytes.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for corporate-front-vue (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging corporate-front-vue across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove corporate-front-vue from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If corporate-front-vue was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks corporate-front-vue before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks corporate-front-vue-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.