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Malicious package

cookie-phasenpm

Malicious code in cookie-phase (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10410
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall cookie-phase

What this malware does

The package presents itself as the popular pino logger (README badges, exported module.exports.pino = middleware) but its name and metadata are unrelated. When a consumer imports the package and invokes the default export as middleware, index.js spawns a detached node child running lib/initializeCaller.js. That child hides the C2 destination inside base64 constants placed in a fake local process.env object (DEV_API_KEY, DEV_SECRET_KEY, DEV_SECRET_VALUE), decodes them at runtime with atob() to produce a URL under ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/..., POSTs to it via axios, and passes the response body directly to new Function('require', response.data)(require). This grants the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution with full Node require access on the host loading the package. The base64 obfuscation of the destination URL and the impersonation of a well-known logger are consistent with a dropper designed to compromise developer and build-system machines that install the package expecting pino.

Malicious versions

1 flagged
2.3.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

17bfab347de8288575bca9677b9eb7652b0024cdbffc1efebe387378c243299c

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cookie-phase (version 2.3.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cookie-phase across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    cookie-phase establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

  3. Did it already run?

    If cookie-phase was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks cookie-phase before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. cookie-phase on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.3.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-009828

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks cookie-phase-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.