cookie-phasenpm
Malicious code in cookie-phase (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package presents itself as the popular pino logger (README badges, exported module.exports.pino = middleware) but its name and metadata are unrelated. When a consumer imports the package and invokes the default export as middleware, index.js spawns a detached node child running lib/initializeCaller.js. That child hides the C2 destination inside base64 constants placed in a fake local process.env object (DEV_API_KEY, DEV_SECRET_KEY, DEV_SECRET_VALUE), decodes them at runtime with atob() to produce a URL under ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/..., POSTs to it via axios, and passes the response body directly to new Function('require', response.data)(require). This grants the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution with full Node require access on the host loading the package. The base64 obfuscation of the destination URL and the impersonation of a well-known logger are consistent with a dropper designed to compromise developer and build-system machines that install the package expecting pino.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cookie-phase (version 2.3.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cookie-phase across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cookie-phase establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If cookie-phase was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cookie-phase before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cookie-phase-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.