confluence-editornpm

package.json declares a dependency whose value is a bare HTTPS URL (https://repo.securityctrl.com/confluence-editor) rather than a semver range published to the npm registry. The dependency key equals the package's own name, matching a dependency-confusion shape, and the version 30.0.0 is implausibly high for a package of this name. On npm install, npm fetches whatever tarball that URL currently returns and executes any lifecycle scripts inside it, with no version pin, no integrity check, and no registry provenance. The shipped index.js is an inert stub, so the manifest line itself is the entire published attack surface — the actual code that runs on installers is served from repo.securityctrl.com and can be changed by whoever controls that host at any time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.