confluence-editornpm
confluence-editor is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15531) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 30.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in confluence-editor (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares a dependency whose value is a bare HTTPS URL (https://repo.securityctrl.com/confluence-editor) rather than a semver range published to the npm registry. The dependency key equals the package's own name, matching a dependency-confusion shape, and the version 30.0.0 is implausibly high for a package of this name. On npm install, npm fetches whatever tarball that URL currently returns and executes any lifecycle scripts inside it, with no version pin, no integrity check, and no registry provenance. The shipped index.js is an inert stub, so the manifest line itself is the entire published attack surface — the actual code that runs on installers is served from repo.securityctrl.com and can be changed by whoever controls that host at any time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for confluence-editor (version 30.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging confluence-editor across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove confluence-editor from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If confluence-editor was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks confluence-editor before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks confluence-editor-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.