configrationnpm
Malicious code in configration (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package impersonates the pino logger (README badges, module.exports.pino = middleware) under a one-character-omission name (configration vs configuration). When a consumer requires the package and invokes the exported middleware factory, index.js detaches a child process running lib/initializeCaller.js. That child decodes a base64-obfuscated URL stored under decoy field names (DEV_API_KEY, DEV_SECRET_KEY) inside a locally shadowed process object, resolving to https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df. It POSTs the entire spread process.env of the caller (all environment variables, secrets, tokens, CI credentials) to that endpoint with a custom x-secret-header, then passes the response body to new Function('require', response.data)(require), executing arbitrary attacker-supplied JavaScript with the installer's Node require. This is a combined credential exfiltration + remote-code-execution channel gated only by requiring/loading the module.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for configration (version 2.3.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging configration across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
configration is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If configration was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks configration before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks configration-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.