Which versions of compose-logger-stand are malicious?

The following npm versions of compose-logger-stand are flagged malicious: 1.0.126. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate compose-logger-stand if I installed it?

compose-logger-stand is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed compose-logger-stand — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If compose-logger-stand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is compose-logger-stand part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — compose-logger-stand is associated with the GHSA-9wv2-6h9j-773q, IN-MAL-2026-011269 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find compose-logger-stand across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for compose-logger-stand (version 1.0.126). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging compose-logger-stand across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

compose-logger-standnpm

compose-logger-stand is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11267) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.126). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in compose-logger-stand (npm)

MAL-2026-11267

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall compose-logger-stand

What this malware does

[email protected] presents itself as a logger but its shipped code implements a credential-harvest and exfiltration pipeline. dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js and dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js scan for secrets and POST results to huggingface.co endpoints (agentStartupAudit.js lines 490-563). dist/discord/discordRelayUpload.js (and its dist/-root duplicate) implements upload-via-Discord relay with base64-decoded payloads and repeated POST calls (lines 306/321/398), together with host reconnaissance primitives (ping). dist/relay/relayServer.js embeds a relay server with the same recon primitives. dist/core/deploymentDefaults.js and dist/hf/hfCredentials.js carry base64-encoded blobs holding embedded credentials/config used to authenticate to those services (scripts/encode-deployment.mjs is the author's own encoder utility for producing them). scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs is wired as a lifecycle agent that performs network I/O (GET, ping) at install time, so installing the package auto-executes the exfiltration/relay agent without any explicit user invocation. The combination — install-time agent + hardcoded third-party relay endpoints + shipped base64-obfuscated credentials + secret-scanning modules feeding those relays — is a credential-distribution / active-exfiltration package, not a logging library.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.126

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

a2806aaee4d412283a023e43465c94a4ad670b665fc8c0948b25ab0f66536450

a34de797bc2020fd52b9b36fda8513a111610612c3a50e75d8ea8a79440be4f0

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for compose-logger-stand (version 1.0.126). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging compose-logger-stand across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
compose-logger-stand is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If compose-logger-stand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks compose-logger-stand before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. compose-logger-stand on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.126 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-9wv2-6h9j-773qIN-MAL-2026-011269

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks compose-logger-stand-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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