commonweb-flownpm
commonweb-flow is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2025-6894) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 1.0.0, 5.8.999, 5.999.999…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in commonweb-flow (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] declares its sole dependency linker-event-header-serial as a direct tarball URL on artifacts.yosiroute.com (not the npm registry), and npm-shrinkwrap.json marks that dependency with hasInstallScript: true. On npm install, npm fetches the tarball from artifacts.yosiroute.com and runs its lifecycle install scripts, giving that host arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine. The tarball contents at that URL are mutable and can be swapped server-side without republishing commonweb-flow. Package metadata is placeholder (author: "Package Registry", description: "Generated package", repository github.com/example/commonweb-flow), and the manifest version 7.999.999 is inflated relative to the README/index.js self-reported 1.0.0 — the shape of a dependency-confusion lure aimed at internal builds that resolve commonweb-flow from the public registry over an internal package of the same name.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'commonweb-flow' @ 10.11.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
-
The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
-
The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for commonweb-flow (15 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging commonweb-flow across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove commonweb-flow from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If commonweb-flow was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks commonweb-flow before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks commonweb-flow-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.