Which versions of commandor-core are malicious?

The following npm versions of commandor-core are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate commandor-core if I installed it?

commandor-core establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed commandor-core — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If commandor-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is commandor-core part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — commandor-core is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018243 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find commandor-core across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for commandor-core (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging commandor-core across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

commandor-corenpm

commandor-core is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14173) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in commandor-core (npm)

MAL-2026-14173

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall commandor-core

What this malware does

The postinstall script in [email protected] (scripts/postinstall.js) contains XOR-obfuscated byte arrays that decode at runtime (unpackSegment with key 'stf2026') to a download URL at giphub.com — a typosquat of github.com — pointing at https://giphub.com/bebraz1/PzM50V1AKG0rVlH/releases/download/null/main.exe. On Windows the script fetches main.exe into %TEMP% and spawns it detached; on WSL it decodes and invokes a PowerShell bridge command to execute the fetched binary on the Windows host. The same postinstall unconditionally POSTs a JSON body describing the host platform to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote (assembled from a four-element array to defeat literal-IP scans) over plain HTTP. The main entry index.js is empty; the package provides no library functionality, and the sole effect of npm install commandor-core is beaconing the host and dropping and executing an attacker-controlled Windows executable.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3532b684cf99d23e6ab89c60fef9f2af5b1bfe36f4d793fcaf6bcf3f718903ab

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for commandor-core (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging commandor-core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
commandor-core establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If commandor-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks commandor-core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. commandor-core on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018243

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks commandor-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database