Which versions of comander-lib are malicious?

The following npm versions of comander-lib are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate comander-lib if I installed it?

comander-lib establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed comander-lib — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If comander-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is comander-lib part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — comander-lib is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018240 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find comander-lib across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for comander-lib (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging comander-lib across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

comander-libnpm

comander-lib is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14171) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in comander-lib (npm)

MAL-2026-14171

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall comander-lib

What this malware does

[email protected] is a typosquat of commander with an empty index.js and no native sources. Its scripts/postinstall.js runs automatically on npm install and performs two hostile actions. First, it POSTs the installer's platform label as JSON to a hardcoded bare-IP C2 at http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote, with the host built via array-join (['193','70','34','101'].join('.')) to hide the literal. Second, it XOR-decodes (key stf2026) an attacker-controlled github.com URL and fetches an executable to %TEMP%/main.exe, then spawns it detached with windowsHide:true on Windows. On WSL/virtualized Linux it XOR-decodes a PowerShell bridge command and invokes it to execute the same payload on the Windows host, escaping the Linux sandbox. Addon URL, PowerShell launcher, and script fragments are all stored as XOR-encoded byte arrays decoded at runtime, concealing the destination and command surface. The package advertises itself as a native-addon mirror but ships no addon code, confirming a pure dropper cover story.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

19734d8bfb929b0c1049b6220271fabaa91603506cdcb6424e67988519da9a6e

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for comander-lib (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging comander-lib across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
comander-lib establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If comander-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks comander-lib before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. comander-lib on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018240

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks comander-lib-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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